Battle to Liberate Taejon

The Korean war (1950-1953), during which the young Democratic People’s Republic of Korea smashed the myth of “mightiness” of the US, wrought a lot of military miracles. Among them is a battle to liberate Taejon, which draws the attention of military experts as a brilliant example of the modern encircling warfare.

Having been driven southward by the strong counteroffensive of the Korean People’s Army soon after they started the Korean war on June 25, 1950, the US and its south Korean puppet army proclaimed Taejon their “temporary capital” and built strong defence positions to make it the “line of no retreat,” in a bid to check the offensive of the KPA ultimately.

The US moved its 24^th Infantry Division and the remaining south Korean troops to Taejon. Besides, it brought in reinforcements of two divisions to provide a good opportunity for the defence of Taejon and switchover from retreat to offensive. Its troops, weaponry and combat and technical equipment were concentrating at Taejon.

The world media gave broad coverage of the forthcoming battle at Taejon. The Western media bragged that the major force of the US 8^th Army would finish their deployment soon, signalling the end of the first stage of the war, and at the same time there would be no more chances for the KPA to win a victory.

At this critical moment the KPA encountered an unexpected obstacle in implementing its operations to seize Taejon.

The combined units in the main prong were advancing towards Taejon as planned but the one expected to encircle Taejon to the southeast failed to speed up its offensive, blocked in Chongju by the persistent resistance of the numerically superior enemy.

Success or failure in the encircling operations depended on how fast and thoroughly they would encircle the enemy. Something should be done against this grave situation, otherwise, the area southeast of Taejon would be kept open, leading to the failure of encirclement. Then the US 1^st Cavalry Division and the 25^th Infantry Division would join those in Taejon.

The success of the operations depended on who would save more time.

Both sides strived to save time from the position of attack and defence respectively. The focus of operations officers from both sides was Chongju. The US tried to block the advance of the KPA in this area and the KPA to break through it.

At this juncture Kim Il Sung visited the Front Headquarters, where he held council of war to correct mistakes and push the operations as planned. He advised that they should not simply focus on Chongju, and put forth a new plan to encircle the city by ordering the units that advanced to Ronsan, southwest of Taejon, to make a detour to the southeastern area.

This was a realistic and original plan suited to the geographical conditions of the country, largely mountainous and with few broad roads.

To turn back the pages of the world history of war, encircling operations by combined units were carried out by joining those at the front and the flanks in a certain depth or by joining those in and out. However, they required broad roads and a huge attacking force. Such tactics did not fit the specific conditions of Korea. Worse still, the enemy was superior both numerically and technically.

The new plan was original; by detouring Taejon along mountains to the flank and rear of the enemy with light weaponry and secretly encircling the area the KPA soldiers could block the enemy’s retreat, free from the limitations of the routes, manpower and military hardware; by attacking the enemy in the flank and rear they could smash them easily and quickly.

According to this plan the combined unit which advanced to the area of Ronsan marched 40 kilometres a night by mountainous road, each man carrying 20-30 kg of arms, and cut off the enemy’s retreat. Still, the enemy was not aware of this.

Finally, Kim Il Sung ordered the general offensive to Taejon at 5 am on July 20, 1950.

The US and the south Korean army units were caught in a trap. Dean, commander of the US 24^th Division, was captured by a KPA soldier while escaping in a soldier’s uniform.

The battle costed 24 228 enemy soldiers killed or wounded, 1 000 vehicles, some 150 guns, 49 tanks and 20 000 small arms destructed or captured. The US 24^th Infantry Division and the south Korean puppet army in defence of Taejon were completely defeated.

Referring to the operations, the US military said: The KPA employed the tactics of attacking the defence unit from the front to make its retreat inevitable, and on the other hand checking its retreat by detouring and infiltrating into its rear. It was the kind that the US officers could not grasp before it was too late.