What
are Washington and its allies to do about North Korea? In January, Pyongyang
tested its fourth nuclear device. It launched a satellite in February to gather
additional data for developing an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Meanwhile, North Korean engineers keep cranking out weapons material that could
fuel dozens of nuclear bombs in years to come.
The
international response continues to be ineffective. After much pouting from
concerned countries, the United Nations Security Council recently responded to
the new round of tests with an impressive new collection of sanctions.
The
sanctions promise to halt the movement of contraband by monitoring North Korean
commerce moving in and out of the country, prohibit the export of jet and
rocket fuel to Pyongyang, block the North’s ability to conduct international
financial transactions and ban the export of North Korean coal and minerals.
But they are not enough. Even combined with the previous sanctions, this will
not move the North off its nuclear pedestal. It is simply too late.
First,
it is inconceivable that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would give up the
weapon that places his nation in the exclusive global nuclear club. Pyongyang
has invested so much and come so far to mature a nuclear program that provides
it with an atomic deterrent and a means of intimidation. Second, history
repeatedly shows that sanctions are unlikely to be fully enforced or sufficient
to squeeze North Korea.
Washington
and its allies must now come to the realization that it is time to adapt. Adaptation
has already begun. South Korea has made a multi-year commitment to increase its
military budget and modernize its conventional forces. It has begun deploying
longer-range surface-to-surface missiles and is acquiring U.S. F-35 strike
aircraft. Seoul is talking with Washington about installing the sophisticated
missile defense system Terminal High Altitude Area Defense or THAAD.
Collectively, beefing up of its conventional forces bolsters Seoul’s deterrence
capabilities.
Yet
many in South Korea still fear that Seoul’s military buildup will not be
enough. Some conservative legislators and others both in and out of government
have called for the country to go nuclear. Were that to occur, Seoul would
follow the path of several countries — the Soviet
Union,
Britain, France and Pakistan — that responded in kind to their adversaries’
possession of nuclear weapons.
However,
any move by South Korea to break its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty vows
would pit it against its crucial ally, Washington, which doggedly opposes
nuclear proliferation whether by friend or foe.
In
addition, nuclear acquisition would present South Korea with its own
challenges. Though the country has the technical capacity to build a bomb, it
could take years for it to perfect a delivery device and marshal an effective deterrent,
or use doctrine. The effort would prove costly because it would divert scarce defence
dollars from other vital security needs. It would also raise the ire of China.
Impressing
upon North Korea that no good will comes from its bomb remains critical. It
raises the question of whether more good could come from Washington’s return of
nuclear weapons to South Korea — the United States removed them in 1991 as the
Cold War ended.
Given
North Korea’s unabated nuclear development, is it time to reassess that 1991
decision? Re-installing the weapons would raise a host of additional issues:
Would deployment enhance deterrence or make Pyongyang more trigger happy? Would
it provide Seoul enough reassurance to eliminate any inclination to go nuclear?
Or is offshore deployment enough?
Then,
there is the matter of Beijing’s response. Would the return of the bomb to
South Korean soil prompt a major dustup in Sino-U.S. relations? Or would it
demonstrate Washington’s commitment to assure the security of all its East
Asian allies?
These
open questions deserve robust public debate in the United States and South
Korea. But so does another matter, now even more off the radar. Is it time for
the United States to reach out to North Korea, to formally concede what it
cannot change — namely that North Korea is a nuclear-armed nation — not as any favour
to the Stalinist regime but to generate a quid pro quo, the establishment of
official liaison offices in the two countries’ capitals? This would put in place
a permanent face-to-face communication link to defuse the risk of war should
tensions mount.
The
alternative — keeping North Korea ever more isolated — perpetuates the fantasy
that Pyongyang still can be sanctioned or otherwise induced to give up its
nuclear bombs. Rather, the challenge now is not to bolster quixotic policies
but to nurture others that assure Kim’s bomb does not give birth to a
21st-century nuclear war.
By
Bennett Ramberg March 10, 2016 Bennett Ramberg served as a policy analyst in
the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the George H.W. Bush administration.
He is the author of “Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy.”
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